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ABSTRACT 
The paper analyses why asylum seekers choose Hungary as an entry point to the European 
Union. Among the Central and Eastern European countries Hungary has been by far the most 
popular choice for asylum seekers between 2002 and 2016, yet surprisingly, it has been 
neglected by the literature. Using a panel dataset and fixed effects regressions, the paper finds 
that beyond being ‘conveniently’ located on the Balkans migration route, variables related to 
Hungary’s immigration policy are the most significant determinants of asylum seeker choices. 
The paper finds no evidence to support recent claims by the Hungarian government that arrivals 
to the country are actually economic migrants and not asylum seekers; quite the contrary, the 
results indicate that on average asylum seekers entering Hungary are fleeing violent conflict in 
their countries of origin. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent numbers of asylum applications in the European Union (EU) member states have 
surpassed all previous levels, with members registering a record of 1,322,845 applications in 
2015 (Eurostat 2018). While in the early 2000s flows of asylum seekers were relatively stable, 
a sizeable increase is observable between 2010 and 2016. This increase has not only affected 
the traditional Western European destination countries, but also the Central and Eastern 
European (CEE) EU members, most notably Hungary, which accounted for 82.7% of all 
applications filed in CEE countries in 2015 (Eurostat 2018).  
 
The CEE states are relative newcomers to the field of refugee protection, as many of them had 
no tradition in it before 1989. The creation of asylum policies in these countries and the adoption 
of the relevant acquis communautaire were preconditions towards EU accession. The CEE 
countries needed to join the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), and implement a 
number of directives, including the Reception Conditions Directive (2003), which introduced 
minimum standards for housing and healthcare in member states; the Qualification Directive 
(2004), which set the criteria qualifying asylum applicants for protection; and the Asylum 
Procedures Directive (2005), which regulated the minimum standards for procedures (Toshkov 
and de Haan 2013). As the CEE countries implemented all these directives, one might expect 
asylum seeker flows to be distributed relatively evenly among them, as they all have the same 
minimum standards. However, out of the eleven CEE member states, Hungary, Poland and 
Bulgaria accounted for 79.6% of registered asylum seekers between 2002 and 2016. 
Furthermore, out of 624,250 asylum registrations in the region, 45.2% were lodged in Hungary. 
 
Given this context, the paper has two goals. First, it aims to explain why asylum seekers have 
disproportionately chosen Hungary as their entry point to the EU, by examining the pull and 
push factors which influence their decisions. While it is possible to argue that the preference 
for Hungary can simply be explained by the fact that it was conveniently located on the Balkans 
migration route (at least until the building of a fence on the Hungarian-Serbian border in 2015; 
see Beznec et al. 2016 and Arsenijevic et al. 2017), there is potential for further factors to exert 
influence. Variables which could have made Hungary more attractive to asylum seekers, 
beyond its geographic position, include its decision-making procedures on refugees and the 
relative laxness of its border control between 2002 and 2015. It is unclear however what 
influence these factors have actually had on the decisions made by asylum seekers.  
 
Second, the paper tests whether people registering asylum applications in Hungary are really 
forced migrants. After 2015, the Hungarian government, led by the populist-conservative 
Fidesz party, has claimed that the asylum seekers arriving to the country are actually “illegal 
economic migrants” (The Guardian 2015). The government has used this as a justification to 
implement tighter border controls, including the erection of the fence along the Serbian border, 
and harsher treatment of arriving asylum seekers. By analyzing the factors which drive asylum 
seekers in their selection of Hungary as the country where they file their applications, the paper 
tests this claim of the government. 
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The paper builds on the quantitative literature on asylum seeker destination choices, which 
argues that asylum seekers make rational decisions (Moore and Shellman 2007; Neumayer 
2004; 2005). Using regression analysis, we find that a key pull factor in the case of Hungary 
was the recognition of asylum seekers. The impact of the restrictiveness of the Hungarian 
border was inconclusive. Aid, trade and income differences between Hungary and the countries 
of origin had no significant impact on asylum applications. The results of the push factors are 
consistent with the literature: the intensity of violent conflict in the country of origin increases 
the number of asylum applications, whereas the level of political and civil freedoms are only 
weakly significant determinants. These findings show that the asylum seekers arriving to 
Hungary are more likely to have been refugees, as opposed to the government’s rhetoric which 
claimed that they were economic migrants. 
 
These findings enrich the literature in two ways. First, there have been surprisingly few studies 
beyond Rotte and Vogler (1999) which focus on individual countries as countries of destination 
or transit (Lukic 2016), despite the fact that Moore and Shellman (2007) pointed out the value 
of such research. According to Keogh (2013), only 30% of the variation in asylum applications 
can be explained by the destination country’s GDP, recognition rate and refugee stocks, 
whereas 70% is down to other country-specific factors, which require further investigation. 
Second, the literature has given little consideration to CEE countries as countries of destination 
or transit.  
 
The following section provides key details on the EU’s and Hungary’s asylum system, which 
is followed by a review of the quantitative literature analysing asylum seeker destination 
choices. Subsequently, the paper discusses the methodology and presents the findings, while 
the final section offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. THE EU ASYLUM SYSTEM AND THE CEE STATES  
 
A common asylum system in the EU emerged in 1990 with the Dublin Convention. The goal 
was to establish a framework to determine which EU country is responsible for processing 
which asylum application, and to ensure that each application is processed by only one state. 
Asylum seekers were also required to lodge their application in the first EU state they entered. 
As argued by Guild (2006), the Dublin Convention exempted asylum seekers from free 
movement within the EU. 
 
The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 absorbed the provisions of the Dublin Convention into EU law. 
The Tampere meeting of the European Council in 1999 emphasized the need for the 
establishment of a Common European Asylum System, arising from the inadequate response 
to the Kosovo refugee crisis. Two key principles were adopted in the Tampere Conclusions 
(Guild 2006: 642-643): the harmonization of asylum law at a common minimal level and the 
principle of mutual recognition. This meant that all EU member states had to provide the same 
common minimal standards in asylum qualification, reception and procedures and therefore it 
should not matter where asylum seekers submitted their asylum applications. As pointed out by 
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Toshkov and de Haan (2013), this might turn out otherwise, as member states could be inclined 
to tighten admission standards to push asylum seekers to other member states. However, they 
found no evidence of this race to the bottom, and neither has more recent work (Zaun 2017). 
 
In regard to the CEE member states, ratification of the 1951 Geneva Convention was made a 
precondition for EU accession. Many of these states had little traditions in refugee protection, 
and while the repressive aspects of the EU acquis were quickly implemented, the 
implementation of the human rights aspects did not follow suit automatically (Miciukiewicz 
2011: 184-187). Hungary had some history of accepting refugees during World War II,i but like 
many other Eastern bloc countries, was mostly a refugee sending country, especially in the 
aftermath of the 1956 revolution. Hungarian asylum policy was created due to the increasing 
number of asylum seekers arriving from Romania escaping the Ceaușescu regime in 1989 
(Wetzel 2009). Initially, Hungary only provided asylum protection to Europeans who became 
refugees due to historical events before 1951. This was gradually changed from 1997 onwards 
with the acceptance of Hungary’s first law on asylum and the adoption of the EU acquis, to 
include non-European citizens, provide better reception conditions, and improve judicial 
review. Non-governmental organisations were also given a larger role in assisting asylum 
seekers and refugees. Hungary adopted the repressive elements of the EU acquis as well, such 
as the safe third country principle: this allowed Hungary to send asylum seekers back to 
countries deemed safe which they had moved through on their way to the country. This gave 
Hungary the legal grounds to claim that the applications of asylum seekers who had passed 
through, for example, Ukraine or Serbia, were unfounded (Nagy 2012: 236).  
 
As shown in Table 1, Europe experienced an unexpected influx of asylum seekers in 2015, 
mainly through the Balkan corridor (Arsenijevic et al. 2017; ECRE 2015). The corridor started 
in Turkey, passed through Greece into Macedonia and then onto Serbia and Hungary. Following 
the closure of the Hungarian border in 2015, the route changed to incorporate Croatia and 
Slovenia as well (Beznec 2016). Asylum seekers arriving in 2015 to Hungary showed a variety 
of countries of origin: those arriving in the first two months were mainly from Kosovo, but 
starting from the spring the numbers from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan increased 
dramatically (Juhász et al. 2015). Vulnerable groups composed almost three quarters of asylum 
seekers arriving to the Hungarian border, according to Arsenijevic et al. (2017). 
 
Borrowing Lavenex’s (2001) terminology, Hungarian asylum policy can be characterized as 
shifting from a realist frame, focusing on internal security in the 1990s, to a more liberal frame, 
focusing on human rights, during and after EU accession in the 2000s. Due to the increasing 
number of asylum applications since 2014, a shift back to the realist frame has emerged. Almost 
half of the applications in the CEE countries between 2002 and 2016 were submitted in Hungary 
(see Table 1). These asylum seekers have made conscious choices in selecting Hungary as their 
entry point to the EU, at least when accepting the logic of the rationality of asylum seeker 
behaviour (see Keogh 2013; Barthel and Neumayer 2015).  
 
<TABLE 1> 
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3. WHERE DO ASYLUM SEEKERS GO? 
 
The destination choices of asylum seekers have been relatively well researched in the last 
twenty years. A significant stream in this literature uses quantitative methods (Barthel and 
Neumayer 2015; Davenport et al. 2003; Hatton 2016). This section reviews this literature, 
focusing on the variables which influence asylum seeker destination choices. 
 
When categorizing the variables which determine the choices of asylum seekers, the literature 
has generally followed Lee’s (1966) classic differentiation between push factors (which provide 
asylum seekers with incentives to leave their country of origin) and pull factors (which draw 
asylum seekers to a particular destination country). Most of the early literature focused on pull 
factors. Böcker and Havinga (1998) analysed asylum seeker movements between 1985 and 
1994 to the EU from 44 countries of origin, arguing that asylum seekers favoured the richer and 
larger EU countries, and asylum seekers from former colonies were more likely to move to the 
former colonial power. Economic and cultural pull factors were thus seen as dominant. 
Thielemann (2003) also focused on pull factors, and included 20 OECD destination countries 
between 1985 and 1999. His results also indicated that economic pull factors mattered: high 
unemployment acted as a deterrent towards asylum applications, as did low asylum recognition 
rates and the prohibition of work for recognized refugees. He also found that historical 
relationships and diaspora networks tended to increase asylum applications, as did foreign aid 
from the destination country to the country of origin. The distance between the two countries 
and economic growth in the destination country however had no significant impact. 
 
Economic, political and cultural pull factors were further investigated by Neumayer (2004), 
who included Western European destination countries between 1980 and 1999. Some of his 
findings were consistent with Böcker and Havinga (1998) and Thieleman (2003): GDP per 
capita, common language, colonial history, diaspora networks and the recognition rate were all 
found to be significant pull factors. However, contradicting previous research, he did not find 
evidence for the impact of unemployment or social payments, while he also argued that distance 
and GDP growth were significant determinants. Neumayer’s (2004) findings were supported 
by Keogh (2013), who found GDP per capita, the recognition rate and historical networks (the 
net stock of refugees already in the country of destination) as the most important pull factors to 
the EU. However, he emphasized that these three variables explained less than 30 percent of 
the overall variation in asylum applications, and the rest was down to country specific effects 
(Keogh 2013: 396). Barthel and Neumayer (2015) analysed 19 countries of destination 
(including Hungary) and 153 source countries between 1998 and 2007. They also found that 
the stock of refugees already residing in the country increased the flow of asylum seekers, 
whereas foreign aid from the destination country to the origin country had no impact.  
 
Davenport et al.’s work (2003) was one of the first comprehensive attempts to include push 
factors as well, using 129 countries of destination and origin between the years of 1964 and 
1989, including non-EU/OECD destination countries. In terms of pull factors, historical 
networks were found significant. The size and income of the destination country were not 
significant determinants, contradicting previous findings. Among the push factors, civil war 
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and genocide within the country of origin were the most significant factors, while recent 
democratization coupled with political unrest leads to forced migration. Neumayer (2005) also 
used a model combining push and pull factors, yet his results were quite different. He found 
evidence that economic push factors, such as growth and incomes in the country of origin were 
significant determinants of asylum applications. In terms of political push factors, 
discrimination of minorities, human rights violations, civil and ethnic wars all increased asylum 
applications, while the impact of autocracy was unclear: in some cases democracy leads to more 
asylum seekers as people freer to leave. Pull factors such as aid, trade and colonial ties were 
found to be insignificant.  
 
One of the most comprehensive analyses was conducted by Moore and Shellman (2007), who 
assessed push and pull factors between 1955 and 2001 for all countries for which data was 
available. The results showed that refugees preferred to relocate to countries with higher 
average wages if these were neighbouring countries, however they were less likely to seek 
refuge in countries with higher wages if these were located farther away. Common language, 
colonial ties and diaspora networks all exerted a positive pull on refugee flows, whereas 
democratic institutions in the host country failed to attract greater numbers. Political push 
factors which were significant included genocide, civil war and border war. Hatton (2016) also 
included both pull and push factors in his analysis of asylum flows to 19 OECD countries 
between 1997 and 2012. His results showed that political terror and the lack of civil liberties 
were significant push factors, whereas the lack of political rights and civil war turned out to be 
insignificant. In terms of pull factors, GDP in the destination country was insignificant, while 
higher unemployment decreased asylum applications, both of which contradicting previous 
research. Historical networks and diasporas on the other hand increased applications, which 
was consistent with almost all papers.  
 
Interestingly, almost all contributions in the literature looked at asylum flows to a group of 
countries. Despite the fact that both Keogh (2013) and Moore and Shellman (2007) pointed out 
the value of individual country destination analysis, there has been little research in this regard. 
Rotte and Vogler (1999) analysed migration and asylum seeker flows to Germany between 
1981 and 1995, and concluded that an increase in the income differential between Germany and 
the origin country led to an increase in asylum seekers, and so did an increase in German aid 
and trade. The increase in political terror in the sending country also increased asylum seeker 
numbers, while political rights and civil liberties had no impact. While there have been some 
qualitative inquiries on the topic, such as Lukic’s (2016) paper on asylum seekers in Serbia, we 
are not aware of any other quantitative papers examining asylum flows to a single destination 
country. 
 
The review of the literature shows that there are many contradictions among the findings, 
making it difficult to draw conclusions on the determinants of where asylum seekers go. There 
are only a few variables on which there seems to be consensus. In terms of pull factors, historical 
networks in the forms of diasporas have been found to be significant determinants by most 
studies, which is understandable as people base their decisions on inputs from others who had 
already made such a trip. There is also a consensus surrounding the impact of the strictness of 
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asylum policy within the destination country (such as the recognition rate, reception conditions 
etc.). In terms of push factors, the level of violence in the country of origin is the only 
determinant on which there seems to be agreement.  
 
Most of these discrepancies between the findings of the literature can be explained by key 
methodological differences. First, examining pull factors with aggregate numbers of asylum 
applications from all origin countries will produce different results than including both pull and 
push factors and using destination and origin country dyads. The latter approach, as it includes 
a wider range of variables, is more likely to provide unbiased results. Second, the choice of 
countries and years covered by the analysis also matters. Much of the early literature focused 
on EU or OECD member states. While this approach is fine if one aims to understand why 
asylum seekers go specifically to these countries, it also introduces bias, given that the majority 
of those displaced by conflict do not leave their region (Moore and Shellman 2007: 813). There 
are reasons to expect that the years covered by the studies also matters: more recent asylum 
seekers are better informed than those in the past, and thus better placed to make informed 
decisions (Frouws et al. 2016). Third, regression estimation methods have also differed among 
the reviewed papers: ordinary least squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE) have been the most 
common estimators, but other methods, such as random effects (RE) and the generalized 
estimating equation model has also been used (Neumayer 2005).  
 
Building on the insights from the literature, the following section presents the methods and data 
used in the paper. 
 
4. DATA AND METHODS 
 
The dependent variable in our analysis is the raw number of asylum seeker registrations 
(Neumayer 2005: 396; Moore and Shellman 2007: 820) from a country of origin to Hungary in 
a given year (REGISTRATIONS). Asylum seeker flows are conceptualized as the aggregate 
observable flow of individuals (Neumayer 2005; Moore and Shellman 2007). Data on the 
number of asylum seekers registered by country of origin in Hungary is available from Eurostat 
between 2002 and 2016. Similarly to Hatton (2016), only those countries of origin have been 
included from which Hungary has received at least 300 asylum registrations in total over the 
15 year period. This criteria was fulfilled by 24 countries, and asylum seekers from these 
countries account for 91.4% of registered asylum claims. Given how the dependent variable is 
entered into the regression in logarithmic form, this approach minimizes the number of data 
points with values of zero, while ensuring that there is still sufficient variation in the dependent 
variable. 
The independent variables were grouped into the two larger categories identified in the 
literature review: push factors, which are specific to the country of origin and push asylum 
seekers abroad; and pull factors, which pull asylum seekers to Hungary specifically.  
 
Political push factors include a lack of political freedoms and authoritarianism, a lack of civil 
liberties, and even political terrorism by the state, including the persecution of the opposition, 
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or certain ethnic or religious minorities. The lack of security, or the prevalence of violent 
conflict are also among the most generally cited political push factors. We use several variables 
to capture the effects of these political push factors. First, we use the Political Rights 
(POLRIGHT) and Civil Liberties (CIVLIB) indexes from Freedom House (Neumayer 2005: 
397, Rotte and Vogler 1999: 32). Political rights and civil liberties ratings are measured from 1 
to 7, where 1 represents the greatest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest. Second, we use 
Freedom House’s overall rating of how free a country is (Moore and Shellman 2007: 821). The 
freedom rating is the mean of a country’s political rights and civil liberties ratings. Between the 
scores of 1 to 2.5 the country is categorised as free; between 3 to 5 as partly free and 5.5 to 7 as 
not free. We operationalize the freedom ratings as two dummy variables, equal to one if a 
country is partly free and zero otherwise (PARTFREE); and equal to one if the country is not 
free and zero otherwise (NFREE). Third, we use the Purdue Political Terror Scale to account 
for the lack of security (PTS; Moore and Shellman 2007: 821). The PTS uses a ranking system 
from 1 to 5, where countries ranked at 1 enjoy security and peace, whereas in countries ranked 
at 5, terror has expanded to the entire population. Fourth, the Freedom House and PTS indices 
both use ordinal scales, therefore slight changes, for instance, in terrorist activity may not be 
expressed in a change in the score. Therefore, we also use a variable from the Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program (UCDP; Hatton 2016: 442) to assess the intensity of violent conflict: the number 
of deaths (best estimate) due to violent conflict in a given country of origin in a given year per 
thousand population. If either of these push factors turn out to be positive and significant 
determinants of asylum registrations, then migrants submitting their applications in Hungary 
are more likely to be forced refugees, as opposed to the claims of the government.  
 
The pull variables can be allocated into three larger groups: personal links; economic aspects; 
and qualification and deterrence aspects. Personal links focus on the potential ties asylum 
seekers may already possess in the destination country, as well as the knowledge they have 
about it. Having relatives who can provide information and support already present in the 
destination country makes migration easier. Potential asylum seekers can also get information 
about a destination country from a range of other sources: for example strong economic ties 
between their home country and Hungary can generate some general knowledge about 
Hungary. Geographic proximity between the country of origin and Hungary is also likely to 
make the spread of information easier. To measure personal links and contacts between the 
origin country and Hungary, we use five variables: bilateral trade, foreign aid, migrant 
networks, population and distance (Neumayer 2005: 397; Berthélemy et al. 2009: 1593). For 
bilateral trade (TRADE), the sum of exports and imports (in constant 2015 US dollars) between 
the country of origin and Hungary is used, taken from the International Trade Centre (2018). 
To control for differences in country size, this is divided by the population of the country of 
origin. Aid is measured by the net amount of Hungarian official development assistance 
provided to the country of origin, in constant 2015 US dollars (AID). Aid is also relative to the 
population of the country of origin, and data is from the OECD (2018). Measuring the effect of 
existing migrant networks is difficult, as reliable data on ethnic diasporas is not available for 
Hungary. Instead, we proxy the effect of these networks with the variable MIG-NETWORK 
(Neumayer 2004: 168; 2005: 53; Rotte and Vogler 1999: 32), which is the average of asylum 
seeker applications from the country of origin in the previous two years, using data from 
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Eurostat (2018). To control for differences in country size, the population (in thousands) of the 
country of origin was introduced (POPULATION), using data from the UN (2018). Finally, to 
measure geographic proximity, the straight-line distance between the capitals of the destination 
country and the country of origin is included (DISTANCE; Neumayer 2005: 397; Berthélemy 
2009: 1593). 
 
Economic pull factors mainly relate to differences in welfare and economic opportunities 
between the country of origin and Hungary. Three variables are included to measure these: the 
differences in income between Hungary and the country of origin, unemployment in Hungary 
and Hungarian social welfare expenditure. The idea behind using the income differential as a 
pull indicator is that the higher the income difference between the country of origin and 
destination, the more attractive it is for asylum seekers, especially if they are not only seeking 
safe haven, but are thinking about long term economic prospects. We use Hungary’s GDP per 
capita divided by the GDP per capita of the origin county (INCOMEDIFF; Rotter and Vogler 
1999:32). Data is from the UN (2018). To check whether asylum seekers were motivated in 
their choice of Hungary by additional economic factors, the unemployment rate (UNEMP; 
Thielemann 2003: 19; Neumayer 2004: 167) and the annual average social welfare expenditure 
(WELFEXP; Neumayer 2004: 169) in Hungary were used, both from the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office (KSH 2018). The positive significance of these economic variables would 
lend support to the claims of the Hungarian government regarding the motivations of migrants. 
 
The final group of pull factors, qualifications and deterrence, relate to Hungary’s practice in 
accepting asylum seekers. A liberal asylum system will be a significant pull factor, while strict 
practices will deter asylum seekers. We use four variables: recognition, the share of right wing 
parties in Parliament and two variables to proxy the strictness of the Hungarian border. To 
investigate how the decisions of the Hungarian authorities on whether to grant protection have 
impacted on asylum seeker flows, a variable measuring approved asylum applications 
(RECOGNITION) was used (Böcker and Havinga 1998: 250; Keogh 2013: 376). We expect 
asylum seeker numbers to increase if asylum recognition is high and decrease if rejection is 
high. Neumayer (2004: 169) argues that there may be a negative relationship between asylum 
registrations and right-wing political parties in the country of destination, as right-wing parties 
are usually more hawkish on immigration. The variable POLPARTIES, the ratio of right wing 
political parties in the Hungarian Parliament, is thus included to control for this. Finally, the 
tightness of the Hungarian border is proxied using two variables. Asylum seekers do not always 
enter Hungary using the official border crossings, and in these cases the Hungarian police can 
initiate criminal proceedings. The variable THS, which is the absolute number of proceedings 
in a given year for illegal border crossings, is used to proxy whether this deters asylum seekers 
(data are from the Hungarian police’s OZIRIS system, 2018). The variable SMUGGLING, 
which is the number of human smugglers caught in Hungary also relates to how strictly the 
Hungarian border is patrolled (OZIRIS 2018). A greater number of apprehended smugglers 
should deter asylum seekers.  
 
The dependent and independent variables of the paper are summarized in Table 2. 
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<TABLE 2> 
 
As discussed, the model is estimated using panel data covering the years between 2002 and 
2016 and 24 countries of origin, yielding a dataset with a maximum of 360 observations. 
However, due to the lack of data for some country/years, the actual panel is unbalanced and has 
316 observations. Data was unavailable from Freedom House (2018) for Kosovo between 2002 
and 2008 and for Palestine between 2002 and 2010. In addition, registrations (Eurostat 2018) 
data was missing for Mali between 2002 and 2012, Eritrea (2002,) Morocco (2002) and Sri 
Lanka (2003, 2004, 2006). There was no trade data for Eritrea (2008 and 2009) and Somalia 
(2005). We do not think that these missing data introduce strong bias into the regression, as the 
more recent (post-2010) data, which features higher registration numbers, is complete. 
 
Beyond REGISTRATIONS, the variables WELFEXP, INCOMEDIFF and TRADE were also 
entered in logarithmic form. Time dummies were used to control for the effects of individual 
years on registration numbers. To tackle possible endogeneity of the independent variables, the 
variables AID, TRADE, INCOMEDIFF and THS were lagged one year, as these variables may 
be influenced by asylum registrations.  
 
Estimations were made using pooled OLS, RE and FE methods. We used panel corrected 
standard errors (clustering the standard errors according to the country of origin), making the 
estimates heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust. A histogram of the residuals showed 
that they follow close to normal distribution. Pooled OLS suffers from bias when there are 
omitted variables, which is generally the case in cross-country panel data, as it is impossible to 
include all factors which have an influence on the dependent variable and are time invariant 
(such as culture or geography). RE and FE models both attempt to account for these omitted 
time invariant country-specific effects. The RE model treats country-specific unobserved 
effects as random disturbance, which are uncorrelated with the independent variables. The FE 
model on the other hand removes time-invariant unobserved country effects by quasi-
demeaning the regression equation (Wooldridge 2001). To test which of the three estimators is 
most suitable, we used the test of overidentifying restrictions (Arellano 1993). The result 
showed that the FE method was the better estimator when compared to RE (Sargan-Hansen 
statistic 4416.445; Chi-sq(17); P-value=0.0000). When comparing the RE and the OLS models 
using the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange (BPL) multiplier test, we failed to reject the null hypothesis, 
meaning that the RE model provides the better fit (chibar2(01)=91.69; prob>chibar2=0.000). 
FE is therefore the preferred estimator: the BPL test suggested using the RE model instead of 
OLS, and the test of overidentifying restrictions favoured the FE model over RE.  
 
5. RESULTS 
 
The descriptive statistics for the variables (Table 3), show that there is good degree of variation 
in most of the variables, as standard deviations are generally high. This variation comes from 
both between-country differences, as well as trends over time. Figure 1 disaggregates variation 
for six key variables in case of some of the most important sending countries, Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Iraq, Kosovo, Nigeria and Syria. Panels A and E, for REGISTRATIONS and 
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TRADE respectively, show significant differences between these six countries, but also 
important trends over time. Between 2002 and 2015, REGISTRATIONS followed a u-shape 
trend for Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Iraq, a post-2011 increase is visible for all countries. 
Hungary’s trade has generally followed an increasing trend with these countries with the 
exception of Syria and Bangladesh. INCOMEDIFF (panel B) shows that the gap in incomes 
between Hungary and the six countries have generally decreased between 2002 and 2015, with 
the exception of Syria, although there is significant variation. In panel C, UCDP reflects trends 
in conflict intensity in the six countries: Kosovo and Bangladesh have not suffered significant 
conflict during the period, while there has been a steady stream of conflict-related deaths in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and a more recent spike in Syria. Finally, panels D and F with MIG-
NETWORK and RECOGNITION, show Hungary’s asylum policy was more liberal during the 
early 2000’s, with higher recognition rates. Asylum seekers from Iraq and Afghanistan were 
most likely to be given refugee status, while more recent Syrian asylum seekers have been less 
likely to gain protection. 
 
<TABLE 3> 
 
<FIGURE 1> 
 
Table 4 contains the initial estimates on the determinants of asylum seeker registrations in 
Hungary. For the origin specific variables CIVLIB, POLRIGHT and PTS are not significant in 
either of three models, which corresponds to the findings discussed earlier. PARTFREE and 
NFREE is significant at 5% and 10% respectively which means that if a country is partially free 
from oppression or not free at all, fewer people will have the option to flee. UCDP is significant 
in all three models, although only at 10% in the preferred FE model. This means that if the 
number of fatalities due to violence per 1,000 inhabitants in the country of origin increases by 
one standard deviation (0.35), then asylum seeker registrations will increase by around 28%. 
Among the destination specific variables, MIG-NETWORK was significant only in the OLS 
and RE models. AID and TRADE were not significant. While DISTANCE, due to its time 
invariant nature, could not be used in the FE model, it was significant in the RE model, 
indicating that Hungary may expect more asylum seekers from geographically closer countries. 
Concerning the economic pull factors, no variable turned out to be significant in the FE model, 
although the unemployment rate and welfare expenditures were significant in the OLS and RE 
models. WELFEXP, due to its mostly time invariant nature, could not be used in the FE model. 
Three variables measuring deterrence (RECOGNITION, POLPARTIES and SMUGGLING) 
were significant in the OLS and RE models. RECOGNITION was also significant in the FE 
model at 10% and means that if one additional asylum seeker is recognised as a refugee 
REGISTRATIONS will increase by 0.44%. THS is not significant in the OLS and RE models, 
but is significant in the FE model at 5%, although with a negligible effect. Also, its sign is 
counter-intuitively positive, i.e. higher numbers of captured illegal border crossers lead to more 
asylum applications. This is most likely due to the endogeneity bias coming from the two-way 
causation between the two variables. It is also reasonable to expect that the share of right wing 
parties in Parliament (POLPARTIES) has an impact, as it is highly significant in both the OLS 
and RE models. However, due to its mostly time invariant nature, it could not be used in the FE 
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model. Finally, all three models include time dummies, which are jointly significant in all cases 
(in the FE model, F (12, 23) = 13.46, p= 0.000). R2 is reasonably high at 0.462 for the FE model, 
which shows that overall, it explains a good portion of variance in the dependent variable. 
 
<TABLE 4> 
 
The sensitivity analysis presented in table 5 focused on removing variables. Initially, in Model 
1, the origin specific insignificant variables were removed, which increased the significance of 
THS, UCDP and PARTFREE, while NFREE lost its significance. Second, in Model 2, the 
insignificant destination specific variables were removed (POLPARTIES, UNEMP, 
WELFEXP) together with DISTANCE and MIG-NETWORK. This did not impact on the 
significance of the variables of interest. Third, in Model 3, the TRADE and AID variables were 
removed. This impacted only slightly on the variables of interest. Finally, the remaining 
economic indicator INCOMEDIFF was removed, which increased the significance of UCDP, 
RECOGNITION, SMUGGLING, while decreased that of PARTFREE.  
 
<TABLE 5> 
 
The results of the sensitivity analysis show that among the push variables UCDP is significant 
at a very high level. This means that the push effect of violent conflict in the country of origin 
influences asylum registrations in Hungary to a remarkable degree. At the same time the 
dummy variable PARTFREE is also significant: people are less likely to leave, if they are living 
in a partially free country. At the same time NFREE does not seem to have an impact on asylum 
flows. The economic variables do not have an influence on asylum flows either. The 
qualification and deterrence indicators offer an interesting result: if an additional asylum seeker 
is recognized as a refugee, then this will increase registrations, but the deterrence indicators 
(THS and SMUGGLING) do not seem to impact negatively on asylum seeker flows, which 
shows that the relative tightness of the Hungarian border up until the end of 2016 was not a 
deterrent. This is confirmed by Beznec (2016: 50), who mentions that in 2016 the fence on the 
Hungarian-Serbian border was “in practice incapable of stopping irregular transit migration”.  
 
These findings are consistent with the literature. Recognition, and the level of violence in the 
country of origin were both significant. In addition, we found no evidence that economic factors 
impact on the destination choices of asylum seekers, therefore based on these findings, a 
significant amount of asylum seekers registering in Hungary may have a justifiable claim for 
refugee status. These findings resonate with those of Juhász et al. (2015), who argued that the 
majority of applicants seems to have come from war zones. While it would be possible to 
examine the question with more sophisticated econometric methods, especially in terms of 
handling endogeneity, as our results are in line with the consensus in the quantitative literature 
on asylum seeker choices, as well as the qualitative literature on the Balkans corridor, we 
believe that our model identifies the factors which lead asylum seekers to register in Hungary 
well.  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
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This article aimed to take stock of the factors which determine why asylum seekers choose 
Hungary as their entry point to the EU between 2002 and 2016, representing the first attempt 
to analyze the determinants of asylum seeker choices to a CEE country. The paper had two 
goals: to analyze why asylum seeker chose Hungary, and to test claims of the Hungarian 
government which argued that people arriving are economic migrants and not refugees. 
According to the results, the main determinant was Hungary’s recognition rate. Factors such as 
income, unemployment, trade or aid did not influence asylum seekers in their choice of 
Hungary, nor did the increasing harshness of the Hungarian border, at least until the end of 
2015, when the government started building a fence and significantly increased patrols along 
the border, nor in 2016. We do not dispute the fact that Hungary’s geographic position, i.e. that 
it lies on the Balkans migration route is also a determinant, but we clearly show that there have 
been other factors at play as well. Many asylum seekers, despite lodging their applications in 
Hungary, most likely view it as a transit country along their route, which is partly shown by the 
low number of successful asylum decisions (see also Juhász et al. 2015). 
 
Furthermore, despite the government’s rhetoric and actions, our results clearly show that 
labelling asylum seekers who are fleeing conflict as ‘illegal economic migrants’ is false. 
Economic variables have no impact on the choices of asylum seekers, while fleeing from 
conflict is a highly significant determinant. This result is consistent with the view of the 
European Commission, which opened an infringement procedure against Hungary in December 
2015 concerning changes in its asylum law. The Commission also found that Hungary does not 
comply with the Asylum Procedures, Reception Conditions, Return Conditions Directives as 
well as certain provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (EC 2017). All this implies that 
as long as there is violence in the respective countries of origin, asylum seekers will continue 
to apply for refugee status in Hungary.  
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Table 1. Asylum applications to selected Central and Eastern European Countries (2002-2016) 
COUNTRY/TIME 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
European Union (27 countries) 421,470 344,800 276,675 234,675 197,410 222,635 225,150 263,835 259,400 309,040 335,290 431,090 626,960 1,322,845 1,260,910 
Bulgaria 2,890 1,320 985 700 500 815 745 855 1,025 890 1,385 7,145 11,080 20,390 19,420 
Croatia                 1,075 450 210 2,225 
Czech Republic 8,485 11,400 5,300 3,590 2,730 1,585 1,645 1,235 775 750 740 695 1,145 1,515 1,475 
Hungary 6,410 2,400 1,600 1,610 2,115 3,420 3,175 4,665 2,095 1,690 2,155 18,895 42,775 177,135 29,430 
Poland 5,170 6,810 7,925 5,240 4,225 7,205 8,515 10,590 6,540 6,885 10,750 15,240 8,020 12,190 12,305 
Romania 1,000 885 545 485 380 660 1,175 960 885 1,720 2,510 1,495 1,545 1,260 1,880 
Slovenia 650 1,050 1,090 1,550 500 370 255 190 240 355 295 270 385 275 1,310 
Slovakia 9,745 10,300 11,395 3,550 2,850 2,640 895 805 540 490 730 440 330 330 145 
 
Source: Eurostat (2018) 
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Table 2. Summary of the variables 
 Source Unit Literature 
Dependant variable    
Asylum seeker 
registrations in Hungary 
from country i in year t 
Eurostat Number of registrations Moore and Shellman (2007); Hatton (2016); Barthel and 
Neumayer (2015). 
Independent variables    
Freedom rating  Freedom House PF, NF, F Moore and Shellman (2007). 
Civil liberties Freedom House 1 to 7 Neumayer (2005); Hatton (2016: 442). 
Political rights Freedom House 1 to 7 Neumayer (2005); Hatton (2016). 
Purdue political terror Purdue School 1 to 5 Moore and Shellman (2007); Rotte and Vogler (1999); 
Hatton (2016). 
Deaths due to violent 
conflict  
UCDP Number of deaths per 
1000 inhabitants 
Hatton (2016). 
Total trade between 
Hungary and country of 
origin  
International 
Trade Centre 
Constant 2014 US dollars 
per 1000 inhabitants 
Neumayer (2005); Rotte and Vogler (1999); Berthélemy 
et al. (2009). 
Aid (official development 
assistance) 
OECD Constant 2014 US dollars 
per 1000 inhabitants 
Neumayer (2005); Berthélemy et al. (2009); Barthel and 
Neumayer (2015). 
Migration network effect Eurostat Average number of 
registrations from the 
origin country in the 
previous two years 
Neumayer (2004); Rotte and Vogler (1999). 
Population UN Number of people, 
thousands 
Davenport et al. (2003) 
Distance www.distancefro
mto.net 
Kilometres Neumayer (2004); Berthélemy (2009); Hatton (2016). 
Income differential 
between Hungary and 
country of origin 
UN Difference between GDP 
per capitas in constant 
2014 US dollars 
Rotte and Vogler (1999).  
Unemployment, Hungary KSH Percentage Thielemann (2003); Neumayer (2005); Moore and 
Shellman (2007). 
Social expenditure, 
Hungary 
KSH Hungarian Forint Neumayer (2004). 
Recognition  Eurostat Number of positive 
decisions 
Böcker and Havinga (1998); Neumayer (2004); Keogh 
(2013). 
Share of right wing parties 
in the Hungarian 
Parliament 
parlament.hu Percentage Neumayer (2004). 
Captured illegal border 
crossers  
OZIRIS Number of people Thielemann (2003). 
Apprehended human 
smugglers  
OZIRIS Number of people  Thielemann (2003). 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependant variable       
REGISTRATIONS 345 826.4957 4778.001 0 64585 
Independent variables      
PARTFREE 344 0.380814 0.486294 0 1 
NFREE 344 0.5 0.500728 0 1 
CIVLIB 344 4.75 1.391876 2 7 
POLRIGHT 344 4.97093 1.663981 2 7 
PTS 354 3.559322 0.932957 1 5 
UCDP 355 0.073845 0.352063 0 3.56179 
TRADE 353 12653.89 42701.11 0 316039.9 
AID 356 36.24168 172.8973 0 2459.03 
MIGNETWORK 342 537.1257 2893.008 0 35720 
POPULATION 360 151231.3 342924.3 0 1378665 
DISTANCE 360 3950.487 2217.581 351.17 8081.68 
INCOMEDIFF 360 12.2217 22.93411 1.139672 134.889 
UNEMP 360 0.080168 0.020559 0.05168 0.11172 
WELFEXP 360 22929.25 4566.994 14649.51 27346.83 
RECOGNITION 354 16.76554 62.41417 0 865 
POLPARTIES 360 0.612549 0.166881 0.421875 0.802597 
THS 360 35672.27 97365.35 2471 397418 
SMUGGLING 360 390 183.3431 144 688 
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Table 4. Regression results 
 
 Pooled OLS 
lnREGISTRATIONS  
RE 
lnREGISTRATIONS  
FE 
lnREGISTRATIONS 
PARTFREE -.0.341 -0.242 -1.213** 
 (0.899) (0.772) (0.446) 
NFREE -0.394 -0.712 -1.442* 
 (1.434) (1.099) (0.817) 
CIVLIB 0.208 0.303 0.440 
 (0.266) (0.285) (0.407) 
POLRIGHT -0.0233 -0.000160 0.0189 
 (0.199) (0.147) (0.243) 
PTS 0.0510 -0.0767 -0.0432 
 (0.244) (0.196) (0.167) 
UCDP 0.554** 0.986*** 0.809* 
 (0.236) (0.271) (0.423) 
L.lnTRADE -0.0201 0.0440 0.0980 
 (0.125) (0.119) (0.161) 
L.AID 0.000956 0.000257 0.0000658 
 (0.000691) (0.000267) (0.000208) 
MIG-NETWORK 0.000114** 0.0000656* 0.0000420 
 (0.0000426) (0.0000351) (0.0000427) 
POPULATION 7.10e-08 0.000000162 -0.00000196 
 (0.000000604) (0.000000588) (0.00000575) 
DISTANCE -0.000168 -0.000243* 0 
 (0.000133) (0.000131) (.) 
L.lnINCOMEDIFF 0.0325 0.305 1.997 
 (0.333) (0.337) (1.668) 
UNEMP -103.1*** -98.14*** 0 
 (19.40) (19.19) (.) 
lnWELFEXP 71.05*** 68.21*** 0 
 (12.39) (12.44) (.) 
RECOGNITION 0.00700*** 0.00514*** 0.00440* 
 (0.00170) (0.00158) (0.00239) 
POLPARTIES -127.3*** -122.4*** 0 
 (23.24) (23.28) (.) 
L.THS 0.00000161 0.00000214 0.00000336** 
 (0.00000286) (0.00000280) (0.00000124) 
SMUGGLING -0.0219*** -0.0206*** 0.00138 
 (0.00479) (0.00481) (0.00135) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Constant -600.0*** -576.6*** -3.075 
 (104.9) (105.2) (3.762) 
Observations 316 316 316 
R2 0.449  0.462 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
  FE 
lnREGISTRATIO
NS  
 FE 
lnREGISTRATIO
NS  
 FE 
lnREGISTRATIO
NS  
 FE 
lnREGISTRATIO
NS  
UCDP 0.821** 0.892** 0.863** 1.254*** 
 (0.361) (0.416) (0.404) (0.256) 
RECOGNITION 0.00449* 0.00442* 0.00408* 0.00474** 
 (0.00225) (0.00232) (0.00225) (0.00172) 
L.THS 0.00000343*** 0.00000388*** 0.00000400*** 0.00000343*** 
 (0.00000111) (0.000000974) (0.000000977) (0.000000982) 
SMUGGLING 0.00177 0.00176 0.00184 0.00302*** 
 (0.00127) (0.00130) (0.00129) (0.00100) 
PARTFREE -1.160*** -1.185*** -1.116*** -1.102** 
 (0.401) (0.400) (0.372) (0.395) 
NFREE -1.195 -1.185 -1.091 -1.355 
 (1.076) (1.104) (1.133) (1.151) 
L.lnINCOMEDIF
F 
2.167 2.262 2.180  
 (1.584) (1.564) (1.563)  
L.AID 0.000119 0.0000829   
 (0.000208) (0.000184)   
L.lnTRADE 0.100 0.0838   
 (0.161) (0.163)   
UNEMP 0    
 (.)    
lnWELFEXP 0    
 (.)    
DISTANCE 0    
 (.)    
POLPARTIES 0    
 (.)    
MIG-NETWORK 0    
 (.)    
CIVLIB     
     
POLRIGHT     
     
PTS     
     
POPULATION     
     
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.475 -0.523 0.0542 3.767*** 
 (2.790) (2.779) (2.525) (0.653) 
Observations 316 316 320 320 
R2 0.456 0.452 0.451 0.432 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1. Trends in selected variables in key sending countries 
 
   
   
   
Source: authors 
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ENDNOTE 
 
i Hungary did provide asylum protection before 1944 to a number of Polish, French, Czech and Jewish refugees. 
However, when Hungary was occupied by Germany in 1944, these refugees were arrested (Wetzel 2009). 
                                                            
